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Abstract
Vulnerabilities of complex networks have became a trend topic in com-
plex systems recently due to its real world applications. Most real net-
works tend to be very fragile to high betweenness adaptive attacks. How-
ever, recent contributions have shown the importance of interconnected
nodes in the integrity of networks and module-based attacks have ap-
peared promising when compared to traditional malicious non-adaptive
attacks. In the present work we deeply explore the trade-off associated
with attack procedures, introducing a generalized robustness measure and
presenting an attack performance index that takes into account both ro-
bustness of the network against the attack and the run-time needed to
obtained the list of targeted nodes for the attack. Besides, we intro-
duce the concept of deactivation point aimed to mark the point at which
the network stops to function properly. We then show empirically that
non-adaptive module-based attacks perform better than high degree and
betweenness adaptive attacks in networks with well defined community
structures and consequent high modularity.
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1 Introduction
Structural vulnerabilities of real systems have attracted much attention from the
network science community recently [1, 2] both from the attack point of view
(when we are interested in disabling or fragmenting a network with as little effort
as possible) [3] and from the security point of view (when we wish to created
safer networks or to defend them against targeted or malicious attacks) [4]. For
instance, the operation of internet routers [5], the delivery of drugs in biological
systems, the propagation of an epidemic disease [6], the security of a power
grid [7, 8], or even the operativeness of organized crime or terrorist cells [9]
are all examples of networking systems in which we are much interested either
in devising efficient attack strategies to rapidly atomize the network [10] or in
adopting defensive actions to prevent the system from collapsing [11].
Networks might be structurally affected either by random removal of nodes
(failures) or by targeted or malicious attacks [12–15]. Targeted attacks are
usually aimed to disrupt the system by removing a small fraction of nodes or
edges. In this sense, traditional attack methods usually focus on the sorting of
nodes according to their importance in the network architecture, i.e. according
to some centrality index —betweenness and degree-based attacks usually present
better results [16].
Basically there are two approaches for network fragmentation: non-adaptive
(or simultaneous) attacks and adaptive (or sequential) attacks. In the first
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approach, the list of attacked nodes or edges is produced only once, before the
removal procedure starts [16]. In the second [17,18] approach, the list of targets
is updated after each deletion by recalculation of the centrality index used to sort
nodes or edges. Consequently, high adaptive attacks demand more processing
time, but on the other hand the method usually produces more damage per
removal when compared to the non-adaptive approach. The reason is more or
less obvious: if the list of attack is measured only once, the method cannot
account for the changes in the centrality order due to the removal of elements.
So, in the worst case the high adaptive version of a procedure is as good as the
non-adaptive approach, however it is generally better.
Nonetheless, real networks tend to organize into modular structures or com-
munities —clusters densely connected internally but sparsely connected among
them [19]— and recently it was shown that the nodes bridging communities are
even more crucial in keeping networks from falling apart than highly connected
vertices [20, 21]. Even more recently, it was shown empirically that module-
based attacks (MBA) targeting interconnected nodes (communities bridge) can
damage real networks with more efficiency than other non-adaptive targeted
attacks [22].
Hereupon, although there has been much work recently on network robust-
ness, the balance between a given network damage and the computational cost
(run time and/or hardware capacity) necessary to reach that desired level of
fragmentation is an issue not yet properly addressed by previous contributions.
Usually the only aspect taken into account is the efficiency in terms of the
ratio between the damage produced and the fraction of removed nodes. In
this contribution, apart from that feature, we consider the trade-off between
the network robustness and the computational cost of a given network attack
strategy. More precisely, we focus on the cost/benefit relation of adaptive and
non-adaptive attacks to modular networks in order to rightly chose the most
appropriate strategy to atomize large complex networks.
2 Module-based attacks
The MBA procedure mentioned above is a non-adaptive attack which consists
of targeting interconnected nodes ordered by betweenness centrality. Besides,
once a node from a edge between two connected modules is deleted, there is no
need to erase its counterpart unless it still connects to other communities —the
vertices belonging to this set are called independent interconnected nodes. Fur-
thermore, the attack is aimed at the largest remaining connected component of
the network after each step. As detailed in [22] in module-based attacks for real
networks, the communities are usually extracted by an heuristic community de-
tection algorithm due to the size of such systems and consequent computational
requirements. Besides, the effectiveness of the MBA procedure is closely related
to the modularity of the network.
The modularity of an unweighted network is usually defined as the den-
sity of links inside communities as compared to links between communities, as
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follows [1]:
Q =
1
2m
∑
i,j
[
Aij − kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj) (1)
where Aij is the adjacency matrix (taking the value 1 when there is a link
between nodes i and j, 0 otherwise), ki is the vertex degree of node i and ci
represents the community to which this node belongs. The δ-function δ(u, v) is
1 if u = v, 0 otherwise and m is the total number of edges.
In this sense, many methods for community detection have been devised
over the last few years. Therefore, the issue of testing the accuracy of commu-
nity extraction algorithms is crucial in studying modular networks. In order
to test the performance of algorithms for community extraction (or identifica-
tion), several benchmark for computer generated networks, with well-defined
community, structures have been proposed. One of the first introduced bench-
marks for testing community detection is a class of artificial undirected net-
works proposed by Girvan and Newman (GN) [23]. It consists of networks with
nodes having approximately the same degree, as in a random graph, but with
nodes preferentially connected to nodes of their group. However, real networks
have heterogeneous distributions of node degree and community size accounting
for several remarkable features of real networks, such as resilience to random
failures/attacks and the absence of a threshold for percolation and epidemic
spreading. In this sense Lancichinetti, Fortunato, and Radicchi have proposed
an undirected network benchmark (LFR) [24] which assumes that both degree
and community size distributions are power laws.
In these benchmarks, the modularity is controlled by the mixing parameter
µ, which is the ratio between the number of edges linking a vertex to other
communities and its degree. In other words, each node shares a fraction µ of
its edges with nodes of the entire network and a fraction 1 − µ of its edges
with nodes of its own community. Thence, small values of µ indicate well
separated module, whereas higher values means communities are ill defined and
possibly overlapped. It should also be noted from now on that the average
module size usually depends on the accuracy and the detection threshold of the
community extraction algorithm. However, as pointed out in [25] the Louvain
algorithm by Blondel et al. [26] is known to perform very precisely in both
GN and LFR benchmarks. Therefore, in simulations hereafter we use only the
Louvain method to detect communities.
2.1 Deactivation point and the generalized robustness
Even though there has been many works recently concerning the robustness of
complex networks, there is not an unique definition of it [12–14,16]. Robustness
might be defined as the ability of a system to keep a set of defined features or
services working when subject to perturbations or attacks [27]. This response to
perturbations is tightly coupled to the goal of the real system subjacent to the
graph representation in such a way that the robustness is service dependent [28].
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Therefore, the robustness of complex abstract graphs, in which the system dy-
namics is not taken into account, should be addressed by either topological
phase transition points or, in the absence of such behavior, by general functions
representing the overall response of the network topology to a desired strategy
of attack or fragmentation [29–34]. In this context, robustness is typically con-
sidered in a percolation framework and quantified by the critical fraction ρc of
nodes that once removed by degree-based attacks leads to complete atomization
of the network. At that point, one may safely say that the network stops func-
tioning as whole because there is no giant component connecting the system
according to the Molloy-Reed criterion. In this framework, in order to quantify
the effect of the attacks on the networks [35], it is usually defined the order
parameter σ(ρ) = NLN as the relative size of the remainder network size relative
to the original network size as a function of the fraction of nodes deleted.
However, modular networks usually present a transition point that marks
a phase where all communities are detached from the main graph. At this
point, the largest cluster size would be equal to the original network’s maximum
module size Nmax and the critical fraction of nodes that should be deleted in
order to stop the normal operation of the network is given by what we call the
deactivation point Pd = (σd, ρd), where
σd =
Nmax
N
, (2)
is the size of the largest module as compared to the original network size and
ρd is the fraction of independent interconnected nodes. This point depends on
the modular structure of each network and after this phase is reached, commu-
nication would not be possible among large distant pieces of the network. In
other words, this point marks a phase at which the network effectively stops
functioning as a whole much earlier than the percolation threshold under hub
attack and before the network atomizes completely.
On the other hand, in order to compare the deactivation threshold (ρd) of
networks with different topologies, the size of the largest community (σd) would
have to be similar for most network types. This is not the case as easily ob-
served in Eq. 2. Besides, the attack set should be the same if we are interested
in comparing different networks and multiple attack methods. Again, this is not
case because module-based attacks usually generate attack lists much smaller
than the network size. Therefore, we need a more general robustness approach
to account for situations where the network loses its essential modular func-
tionality before it collapses completely after a given number of nodes, much
smaller than the original size of the network, is removed. In this sense, a more
general approach considers the relative size of the largest remaining connected
component of the network during the attack procedure.
Soares et al. have proposed an unique measure to quantify the robustness of
a system facing malicious attacks [36], that resumes to the area of σ(ρ) curve.
Here, we generalize this concept for targeted attacks that end before all nodes
are removed, such as the module-based attack. In this sense, the robustness of
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Figure 1: The figure depicts the geometric representation of the robustness
as the ratio between the area underneath the red curve and the total area of
possible attack given by area of the rectangle with sides lengths 1−σc and 1 as
defined in Eq. 3.
a network to a particular attack strategy is given by (see Fig. 1 for details):
R =
1
N(1− σmin)
ρmax∑
ρ=0
σ(ρ) (3)
where σ is the size of the largest connected component relative to the original
size of the network, N is the number of nodes in the network, ρ is the frac-
tion of nodes removed, ρmax is the point at which the attack ends and σmin
is the value of the relative size of the largest connected component at ρmax.
This quantity measures the area underneath the σ curve relative to the max-
imum area of attack, i.e. the area of the rectangle delimited by the points
(0, σmin), (0, 1), (1, σmin), (1, 1). In the MBA case, the point (ρmax, σmin) is the
deactivation point (ρd, σd).
2.2 Run-time and attack performance
Usually, the most used and efficient known methods of adaptive network at-
tack are the high degree adaptive attack (HDA) and high betweenness adap-
tive attack (HBA). Therefore, from now on we compare the MBA procedure
to these two methods. In order to study the connection between robustness
and computation time we must calculate the time needed to perform each
attack: HBA, HDA and MBA. Computing the betweenness centrality of all
nodes in an unweighted network usually takes O(NE) time [37] while the de-
gree complexity has a linear dependence O(N + E) [38]. On the other hand,
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even though the exact computational complexity of the Louvain method is not
known, it seems to run in time O(N logN) [26]. Therefore, the computational
run-time of MBA,HDA and HBA attacks are in increasing order of complexity
O(NE + N logN), O(∑ (N + E)) and O(∑NE). As expected, MBA (even
for dense graphs) is less expensive computationally than sequential methods,
followed by HDA and HBA for a given network size.
In this sense, we may define the performance of an attack to a given network
by:
P = 1
t×R (4)
where t is the time taken to complete the procedure in seconds and R is the
robustness. In other words, P measures the trade-off between the network
robustness to a given attack and the time taken to complete the attack– a fast
computing algorithm that efficiently fragments a network should result in high
values of the attack performance P, while very efficient attack methods that are
in turn very slow should have attenuated performance values.
3 Results
We now generate multiple benchmark networks with varying size and modular
structure according to Table 1. For both classes of undirected benchmarks (GN
and LFR) the mixing parameter varies as 0.05 < µ < 0.3 and the modularity
as 0.62 < Q < 0.93. The next step is to analyze both the performance (P) and
the network robustness (R) according to each of the following fragmentation
prescriptions: high degree adaptive attack (HDA), high betweenness adaptive
attack (HBA) and module-based attack (MBA).
As can be seen in Fig. 2, networks with high modularity tend to be less
robust to MBA attacks as expected. However, a new important feature of the
MBA becomes clearer.
As the modularity of the networks is increased simultaneous MBA strongly
outperforms adaptive degree attacks and more, for highly modular networks
the robustness to MBA and high betweenness adaptive attack are very similar,
with the MBA approach being much faster computationally than the sequential
approach. This feature is easily seen by the network performance defined by
Eq. 4. In Fig. 3 we plot P with time measured as CPU time in seconds. Results
show that the MBA approach has a better trade-off between efficiency and
computational cost than adaptive methods. For the chosen LFR benchmarks
the MBA performance always outperforms HBA and HDA performances, while
for the GN benchmarks there is a critical modularity of approximately 0.7 from
which P(MBA) is higher than in the adaptive approaches.
As a final case study, we address a real network representing the European
power grid (EUPG) [39]. This system consists of 1494 nodes and 2322 edges
and a node represents a generator, a transformer, or a substation, while edges
represent a power supply line. The European power grid network is highly
modular with a modularity extracted by the Louvain method of 0.89. As
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Figure 2: The fragmentation process presented by the relative size of the biggest
component σ as a function of the fraction of removed nodes ρ following MBA,
HBA and HDA attacks on the benchmark networks, Girvan-Newman (GN)
and Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Raddichi (LFR) defined in Table 1. Modularity
decreases from left to right. Solid red lines are MBA attacks, dashed black lines
are HBA attacks and dashed-dotted lines are HDA attacks.
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Net N E µ Q
GN1 1000 2500 0.05 0.93
GN2 1000 2500 0.10 0.87
GN3 1000 2500 0.15 0.81
GN4 1000 2500 0.20 0.76
GN5 1000 2500 0.30 0.62
LFR1 1000 2286 0.05 0.91
LFR2 1000 2385 0.10 0.86
LFR3 1000 2314 0.15 0.83
LFR4 1000 2392 0.20 0.76
LFR5 1000 2292 0.30 0.68
EUPG 1494 2322 - 0.89
Table 1: In this table we present the topological data for the five artificial
networks of the Girvan-Newman class (GN1 - GN5), the five artificial networks
of Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi class (LFR1 - LFR5) and the European
power grid system (EUPG). The data consists of the network type, the number
of vertices, the number of edges, the mixing parameter and the modularity.
shown in Fig. 3 and its inset, the performance of HDA,HBA and MBA attacks
in the European power grid network are respectively PEUPG(HDA) = 1.59,
PEUPG(HBA) = 2.73 and PEUPG(MBA) = 15.65. As expected by the an-
alyzes on the benchmarks, in the power grid system the performance of the
MBA prescription is much higher than performance HDA and HBA. Besides,
the network is more fragile to non-adaptive MBA attack than to adaptive HDA
attack and this is due to its highly modular nature.
4 General discussion and conclusion
In this contribution we have introduced a generalized robustness measure and
an empirical performance quantity to measure the trade-off between computa-
tion time and robustness of modular networks facing general attack strategies.
The two concepts were tested for a variety of well known homogeneous and het-
erogeneous benchmark networks which were attacked according to high degree
adaptive attack, high betweenness adaptive attack and non-adaptive module-
based attack. Computer simulations show that the module-based prescription
perform better than degree and betweenness sequential attacks for highly mod-
ular networks —for instance, the European power grid the performance of the
MBA is almost 10 times higher than the performance of HDA and almost 6
times higher than the performance of HBA. This outstanding result means that
networks with well defined communities present robustness to MBA and HBA
very similar but with less computational effort needed to atomize the network
by the MBA procedure. Besides, the networks studied are more fragile to MBA
than to traditional sequential hub attack. These outstanding features highlight
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largest connected component σ as a function of the fraction of removed nodes ρ.
The inset displays the robustness of the network to all three attack strategies.
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the importance of interconnected nodes in maintaining modular networks func-
tioning as a whole. Likewise, we have introduced the concept of deactivation
point where the network loses its functionality and modular structure, which
generally happens much earlier than the percolation threshold usually used to
quantify network robustness.
Finally, we have studied the performance P, the deactivation point Pd, and
the robustness for all three methods described above for a real network example:
the European power grid. This network is highly modular and the attacks tried
on it confirm that the non-adaptive MBA procedure performs better than both
HDA and HBA. Therefore, in order for the power grid system be safer against
malicious attacks, the modularity would decrease by, for instance, rewiring in-
ternal edges in order to increase the number of interconnected nodes.
The work is well posed as simulations were performed in a wide range of
benchmark networks with varying topologies at which the MBA procedure is
known to work very well. We believe that these results might have strong
impacts in improving the robustness of real networks and/or in planning effective
attack strategies to real systems.
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